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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN ILLINOIS

PROVING A MALPRACTICE CASE
An action for malpractice begins with an election between one of two
alternatives. The plaintiff will ordinarily have the option of proceeding in
an action founded on contract or one sounding in tort. The action in contract is predicated upon the defendant's failure to perform an implied
promise to treat the patient with care and skill. The action sounding in
tort, on the other hand, is based upon the defendant-physician's negligence,
irrespective of a promise, express or implied.
The classic difference between contract and tort is the amount of
damages allowable for each cause of action. In an action based on contract,
the plaintiff's recovery is restricted to actual costs and expenses, such as for
nurses, hospital bills and medicines, all of which have been incurred by
the plaintiff by reason of the defendant's breach.' However, if the cause of
action sounds in tort, the plaintiff has the opportunity to seek added indemnification for pain and suffering and mental distress, damages which
2
are unavailable in a contract action.
It is obvious that the suit brought in tort holds a promise of greater
financial reward than one based upon a breach of contract. This is evidenced by the fact that only one case based on contract has been found in
the appellate reports of Illinois. 3 This article will therefore analyze the
necessary requirements for establishing a malpractice case sounding in tort.
The elements necessary to establish a malpractice case are the basic
elements of any negligence suit. The plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant owed him a duty, (2) that the defendant failed to perform or
breached that duty, (3) that the breach was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries and (4) damages.
DuTY
A physician or surgeon must use that degree of skill and care that a
good practitioner under like circumstances would use, but not the highest
degree of care. 4 The court in Holtzman v. Hoy 5 summarized the degree of
care necessary as follows:
The duty which the defendant, as a physician and surgeon,
owed to the plaintiff was to bring to the case . . . that degree of
knowledge .... which a good physician and surgeon would bring
to a similar case under like circumstances . . . . [Tlhis rule . . .
1

Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hosp., 23 Ill. 2d 326, 178 N.E.2d 303 (1961).

2 Ibid.

8 Stanley v. Chastek, 34 II. App. 2d 220, 180 N.E.2d 512 (2d Dist. 1962).
4 Ritchey v. West, 23 I1. 329 (1860). An interesting sidelight to this case was that
Abraham Lincoln was counsel for the defense. He lost at both the trial and appellate level.
5 118 Ill. 534, 8 N.E. 832 (1886).
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does not exact the highest degree of skill and proficiency attainable
in the profession, [but] it does not

merit. 6

contemplate merely average

The surgeon, physician or specialist who heralds himself as being possessed of unusual, extraordinary, unparalleled skills is required to possess
higher skills from the average physician. This is the majority rule and the
one recognized by Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions. 7
Although, the courts of Illinois do not recognize the "schools of medicine" approach in ascertaining what standard of care must be used as a
measure of the defendant's conduct,8 they, however, still follow the "locality
rule." Under the operation of this rule, the defendant is bound to exercise
such care and diligence as a good practitioner practicing in a same or similar
community or hospital.9 The "locality rule" has been severely criticized for
imposing too low a standard on the small town doctor. The Committee that
drafted the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions responded to the criticism of
the locality rule by stating that the rule should only be applied in Illinois
where a physician of a small community is faced with an emergency situation. 10 In such a situation, that physician will be relieved from the use of
appliances and treatment employed by the physician in a larger community.
BREACH OF DuTY

When the physician falls below the standard of conduct required of
him-when he fails to "possess and apply the knowledge and skill and care
that is ordinarily used by reasonably well qualified doctors . . . in similar

cases and circumstances,"" the physician breaches his duty to his patient.
Such breach may occur in one of two ways, by omission or commission. The
failure to do a professionally required act can be as serious as doing it badly.
The plaintiff has the burden of proof in demonstrating that the physician breaches the duty owed. This must be shown by affirmative evidence
that the defendant was unskillful or negligent. 12 Furthermore, as in all
civil actions in Illinois, the plaintiff must plead his freedom from contributory negligence.' 8
As a general rule, the defendant's negligence is not a matter which
ought to be presumed. 14 Also, mere proof that a good result was not achieved
Id. at 536, 8 N.E. at 832.
I.P.I. § 105.02 (1961). See p. 108 and p. 114 of this symposium for a further discussion of the duty of a specialist.
8 Holden v. Stein, 312 Ill. App. 260, 38 N.E.2d 378 (1st Dist. 1941).
6
7

9 Ibid.
10 See comment, I.P.I. § 105.01 (1961). See also Annot., 8 A.LR.2d 772 (1949) and

p. 109 of this symposium for further discussion.
11 I.P1. § 105.01 (1961).
12 Scardina v. Colletti, 63 Ill.
App. 481, 211 N.E.2d 762 (1st Dist. 1965).
'8 Wesley v. Allen, 235 Ill. App. 322 (4th Dist. 1925).
14 Olander v. Johnson, 258 Ill. App. 89 (2d Dist. 1930).
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is not proof of negligence. Instead, the plaintiff must be prepared to show
what the average reasonable physician in good standing would have done in
a similar case and under like circumstances, and that the defendant failed
to conform his conduct to the norm expected. Thus, in Quinn v. Donovan,15
the court held that the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof merely
by showing that his arm was still not healed after treatment by the defendant-physician. As stated in the recent case of Scardina v. Colletti,16 "proof
of a bad result or mishap is no evidence of lack of skill or negligence."
What is sometimes alleged to be malpractice is often an affair of judgment where even two equally eminent practitioners may differ. Therefore,
the courts have come to recognize that if the defendant has given the plaintiff the benefit of his best judgment (assuming it to be medically sufficient)
he is not liable for negligence, even if that judgment be erroneous. 17 In
Wade v. Ravenswood Hosp. Ass'n.,1s the patient suffered from a cervical
fracture and cord injury. One of the procedures generally used in diagnosing
such injuries is the taking of X-rays or spinal punctures and after discovery
of the injury placing the patient in traction. The defendant failed to perform any of these procedures for fear of moving the patient. The court said
that the physician was not negligent for selecting one of the different
methods of treatment, even though it later developed that his choice was
not the best. As long as the patient was the recipient of the physician's best
judgment, and one of the recognized methods of treatment was utilized, the
physician cannot be negligent.
Likewise, in Stapler v. Brownstein,19 an iodine solution was applied to
the plaintiff's leg prior to surgery. This caused the plaintiff's leg to erupt
into blisters at the places where the solution had made contact with the skin.
However, at the subsequent action for malpractice, it was proven by the defendant that his method of treatment was a standardized technique, approved by more than a majority of surgeons, and could not therefore constitute negligence.
There are two types of professional misconduct, the defendant's lack
of skill and the propriety of the treatment.20 Although, the two types of
misconduct are not the same, they have been used interchangeably without
due regard to their differences. Lack of skill involves the defendant's general
ability, competence or professionalism. If lack of skill be the primary issue
of the suit, the physician's reputation as a "bad" or "unskillful" practitioner
is probative. If possible, the plaintiff can show that the defendant has at
15 85 Ill. 194 (1877).
16 63 Ill. App. 2d 481, 488, 211 N.E.2d 762, 765 (Ist Dist. 1965).
17 Ibid.
18 3 Ill. App. 2d 102, 120 N.E.2d 345 (lst Dist. 1914).
19 261 Il1. App. 57 (1st Dist. 1931).
20 J.P.I. § 105.01 (1961) states the physician must possess a certain "skill and knowledge" and second must "use that skill and knowledge"-thus the possibility of two types
of misconduct.
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various times lost his license, is without a license now, has been censured
by his colleagues, or has been banned from one or more hospitals.2 1
However, if such general reputation as to competency is not at issue,
then the plaintiff is, in effect, conceding that the defendant is an otherwise capable practitioner and is, instead, contesting or questioning the
method of the treatment used on the patient. To put it another way, in the
first instance, the plaintiff is actually contending that the defendant is no
healer at all, but more in the image of a quack, irrespective of whether or
not he holds a license. In the second instance, the plaintiff is not questioning
the defendant's professional esteem, but merely alleging that at least this
one time the defendant erred and he must be made to pay for that error.
When the issue is the propriety of the treatment, evidence as to the defendant's reputation is not admissible, whether offered by the plaintiff or the
defendant. 22 However, when lack of skill is the issue, lack of a license, at
least at the time of misconduct, is admissible. 23
PROXIMATE CAUSE

Proximate cause is best defined by "that cause which in natural or
probable sequence, produced the injury complained of. It need not be the
only cause, nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if it concurs with some
other cause acting at the same time, which in combination with it, causes
24
the injury."
The plaintiff must show the same result would not have followed if
proper care had been used, or in the converse, if the defendant shows that
if he treated the plaintiff properly, the same injury suffered from would
have occurred, then the plaintiff has failed to prove the element of proximate cause. For example, if there was improper treatment of a tumor, but
the defendant shows that the patient would have died no matter what the
treatment, there is no "natural or probable sequence [that] produced the
injury complained of."
If the plaintiff is going to have difficulty in proving proximate cause, it
will probably be because of the intervention of another act. This interceding force may be supplied by the plaintiff himself or by a stranger to the
litigation. However, the intervening cause may not be sufficient for the defendant to raise the defense of lack of proximate cause. Thus, in Murdock
v. Walker,25 the father of the deceased infant brought a wrongful death action against the defendant-physician. The cause of death was a lethal dosage
21 See dicta, Holtzman v. Hoy, 118 Ill.534, 8 N.E. 832 (1886).
22 Holtzman v. Hoy, 118 Ill. 534, 8 N.E. 832 (1886).
23 Hubbard v. Martin, 184 I1. App. 534 (1st Dist. 1914).
24 I.P.I. § 15.01 (1961). The last two sentences of the definition are only required in
the jury instruction when there is evidence of a concurrency or contributing cause to the
injury or death.
25 43 Ill. App. 590 (1st Dist. 1892).
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of the wrong medication. The physician, however, argued that the blame
should be placed on the druggist filling the prescription. The physician had
recommended one druggist and the patient used another. The general rule
is that where a patient or those in charge fail to follow instructions of the
physician and injury results, the physician is not liable. 2 However, the
court in finding for the plaintiff, held that in this case the druggist's intervening negligence did not relieve the defendant-physician from liability,
as at most the druggist's negligence concurred with that of the defendants,
which is not a defense.
Proving the all-important element of proximate cause is not simple,
as evidenced by Chase v. Nelson.27 In that case, the plaintiff claimed that
the defendant-physician introduced a catheter into the deceased patient's
urinary tract. Thereafter, the catheter broke off with a part remaining in
the tract. Eventually the broken stub worked its way into the bladder, an
infection ensued, and the patient died. The plaintiff charged that the defendant negligently failed to remove the part of the catheter implanted in
the tract. The trial judge instructed the jury, that if "by reason of the want
of the exercise of ordinary care and skill the broken part of the catheter was
allowed to remain in the urethra ...

and that disease was thereby created

. .'." then the jury shall find for the plaintiff. The jury found for plaintiff
and, predicated on the erroneous nature of the instruction, the defendant
appealed.
The Illinois Appellate Court reversed for the defendant, holding the
trial court erred in charging the jury. The court said that the instruction
given was erroneous because it failed to link the defendant directly with
the contributing cause of the patient's death. Under the instruction given,
no matter how remote the defendant's negligence, the jury was empowered
to find him liable.
DAMAGES

The last indispensable element of the tort is damages. The concern
for recovery initiates the dispute and it is here where it ends. It must be
first noted that no matter how flagrant a violation of misconduct the defendant-physician has committed, unless the patient suffers damages no
cause of action exists.
Assuming damages do exist, what are the elements? First, the patient
may recover for the physical pain suffered and reasonably certain to be suffered in the future. Taken into consideration will be the nature, extent, and
duration of the injury and any disability or disfigurement suffered. The
pain and physical suffering caused in the ordinary course of this physician
or any other physician treating the patient is not recoverable and must be
26 Wesley v. Allen, 235 Ill. App. 322 (4th Dist. 1925).
27 39 Ill. App. 53 (2d Dist. 1890).
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separated from the additional pain and suffering caused by the defendant28
physician's negligence.
Secondly, the plaintiff will be able to recover for mental suffering; that
is, he can recover for all suffering that is not physical. For example, fear of
disfiguration is a proper element to be considered by the jury.29 Also, increased nervousness, and loss of sleep could be included as damages.
Reasonable expenses of medical care incurred and reasonably certain
to occur in the future is a proper element of damages. For example, if the
patient is forced to incur expense in having other physicians correct the
error of the defendant, or if he becomes legally obligated to pay hospital
bills which result as a proximate cause of defendant's negligence, then, as
in any personal injury action, the defendant is liable for them.
Also, elements of damage are the value of the plaintiff's time lost and
his impaired earning capacity. Time lost refers to the wages the plaintiff
would have received if he had not been injured by the defendant. Impaired
earning capacity refers to the plaintiff no longer being able to handle the
same work once he recovers. In claiming damages for time lost, the patient
may not claim the time off which was a result of his original illness or
malady, but only the added time off resulting from the defendant's negligence.
If the patient dies as a result of the defendant-physician's breach of
duty owed, the action will be one for wrongful death. The basis of damages
when the suit is for wrongful death is the pecuniary loss to the spouse and
next of kin.30 This is measured by the beneficiary's financial dependency
upon the decedent and may not be measured by the physical or mental
suffering of the decedent or any of the other elements provable in an ordinary personal injury action. Some of the considerations in determining
damages in a wrongful death action are: How greatly the survivor depended upon the deceased for his maintenance? What the deceased had
earned, was earning and could reasonably be expected to earn in the
future? What was decedent's age, his health, his occupation and personal
31
traits, such as thrift and sobriety?
In all types of medical malpractice suits filed against him, the defendant
may attempt to mitigate his liability. One method of doing this is by
showing an aggravation of the injury by the patient's own conduct. Thus, in
Jenkins v. Charleston Gen. Hosp. and Training School,32 where the patient's arm was set incorrectly and the patient was advised to return to the
hospital but failed to do so, the court held that the plaintiff could only reWenger v. Calden, 78 111. 275 (1875).
Simon v. Kaplan, 321 Ill. App. 203, 52 N.E.2d 832 (Ist Dist. 1944).
30 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 70, § 2 (1965).
31 See I.P.I. § 31.02 (1961).
32 90 W. Va. 230, 110 S.E. 560 (1922). See also dicta, in Wesley v. Allen, 235 Il1, App.
322 (4th Dist. 1925).
28
29
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cover to the extent that his injury was attributable to defendant's lack of
care, but not to the extent that he contributed to his own injury.
In order to mitigate damages, the defendant-physician may also show
that other doctors operated on or treated the plaintiff and that they either
caused or contributed to his death or injury. 8
34

THE NEED FOR THE EXPERT WITNESS

It is almost impossible for a plaintiff to successfully litigate a malpractice suit without the use of expert testimony. In most cases, it will take
another physician to illuminate the standard of conduct the average physician in good standing would follow in the same or similar circumstances.
The reason the expert is such a necessity is that the jury could not ordinarily be expected to possess knowledge of the scientific intricacies around
which the dispute will center. A juror would not ordinarily appreciate what
techniques are outdated, too progressive, or merely ill-advised. If a juror
was so gifted he would almost certainly be excused so as to avoid the socalled "one-man jury." Thus, unless the issues involved would ordinarily
be considered within the framework of common knowledge of the jurors,8 5
the expert is indispensable in proving the first element of a malpractice
case, duty.
The expert may also testify as to whether the defendant-physician
breached the duty owed, that is, whether the defendant fell below the
standard of conduct required of him.8 6 It should be noted that the expert
is only of practical usefulness in this stage of the proof. Once the qualified
expert has delineated what the standard of conduct should have been, the
jurors can judge for themselves whether the defendant-physician was in
conformity with that standard.
Third, the expert is necessary in showing the injury complained of
was the proximate cause of the negligence of the defendant; that is, that
the cause was a natural or probable sequence producing the injury. The
plaintiff must show that the injury would not have occurred if he was
treated properly. For that purpose, he can call the expert to the stand to
testify as to the normal expectations of this type of treatment when done
properly, thus leaving it to the jury to decide whether the method used by
the defendant directly produced the injury.
Lastly, the expert is helpful in informing the jury as to the damages
the plaintiff has suffered. Where the injury suffered is internal, the expert
can testify as to the physical pain the plaintiff has suffered. The expert can
also testify as to the extent and duration of the injury caused by defendant's
negligence.
33
34
35
36

Cf. Peters v. Howard, 206 11. App. 610 (Sd Dist. 1917).
For a general discussion on the need for an expert see, Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 597.
Lucarelli v. Winters, 320 Ill.
App. 359, 51 N.E.2d 205 (1st Dist. 1949) (abstr.).
Gorman v. St. Francis Hosp., 60 Ill.
App. 2d 440, 208 N.E.2d 653 (1st Dist. 1965).
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Who is qualified to be an expert? Generally, in order to qualify a witness to give an opinion in a malpractice case, it need only be established
that one is a licensed practicing physician of the state in which trial is being
held, and that he is a graduate of a regular medical college. However, it is
also helpful to show that he has practiced for a number of years, that he is a
diplomat of the American Board in the appropriate specialty and that he
has written widely. It should be noted, however, that to give an expert
opinion, one need not have had personal observation or experience, but his
information can be derived solely from medical textbooks. A doctor who has
retired, or who is a medical researcher, or the competent, but untried and
youthful physician all could be qualified and used as an expert. Often it is
37
only the latter group that is available to the plaintiff.
Although Illinois follows the locality rule in having an expert qualify,
the rule does not appear to be strictly adhered to. The locality rule prescribes that the expert witness be familiar with the medical procedures of
the defendant's locale. However, in Holcomb v. Magee,38 an expert from
another city was premitted to testify as to the operation of an X-ray
machine. In that case, the plaintiff claimed to have suffered burns from defendant's negligent operation of such machine. The court felt that merely
because the expert was from another city, he was not disqualified as an expert when there is a showing that he was familiar with this type of X-ray
machine.
THE "CONSPIRACY

OF SILENCE"

The "conspiracy of silence" is a label which has been given to a situation which is best defined as the conscious or tacit refusal by physicians,
surgeons, or specialists to testify against their colleagues who are defendants in a malpractice action.39 The natural result of this refusal to testify
is that a defendant with a meritorious cause of action is unable to acquire
expert witnesses, without whose testimony he cannot establish his case.
Before developing this area any further, it would be wise to note that
not every refusal by a physician to testify against a fellow physician is a result of the "conspiracy." Such refusal may be because the physician feels
that the plaintiff's case is without merit, fears courtroom drama, or fears
the stigma of being typed as a professional witness. Or the physician's refusal to testify may be merely because he has no time or values his time
beyond what the plaintiff can afford.
Since Illinois does not yet appear to be plagued greatly with the socalled "conspiracy of silence," it is necessary to look at a recent New Jersey
case to best demonstrate how the conspiracy operates. In Steiginga v.
37 See Am. Jur., Proof of Facts, Vol. 9, p. 247 for the questions to be asked in qualifying an expert.
38 217 Ill. App. 272 (2d Dist. 1920). See also, Hundley v. Martinez, W. Va., 158
S.E.2d 159 (1967) for recent rejection of locality rule in qualifying an expert.
39 See Belli, "Ready for the Plaintiff!" 30 Temp. L.Q. 408 (1957).
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Thron,40 the plaintiff in a malpractice action sought adjournment of the
trial because of the sudden refusal by an expert to testify. The reluctant
expert had previously consented to testify and then, suddenly, and without
apparent motive, gave notice of his refusal on the Saturday before trial.
The trial court refused to delay the trial and the plaintiff appealed his denied motion. The appellate court in reversing for the plaintiff criticized the
expert who "declined (on second thought) to testify against a brother practitioner." The court said, "[I]t is a shocking unethical reluctance on the
part of the medical profession to accept its obligation to society and its
41
profession in an action for malpractice."
In another case from the same jurisdiction, 42 the plaintiff sued the
defendant-doctor after the defendant treated the plaintiff for a compound
fracture and negligently left a piece of straw in the injured region. Within
three months, the plaintiff suffered from a tetanus infection. The plaintiff's
only medical expert was an eighty-two year old physician who he had
brought from New York for the sole purpose of testifying. The trial court
refused to permit the expert and dismissed the plaintiff's malpractice case
when he did not bring forward any other experts.
The appellate court, in reversing for the plaintiff, stated that the mere
fact that an expert is from another state does not disable him from testifying if he is otherwise qualified by his knowledge and experience. The
court recognized the problems a plaintiff has in getting experts and declared as dictum:
[T]here is a well-known reluctance of members of the medical
profession to testify against fellow practitioners ... [which] confronts plaintiff with a serious problem of proof . . . .[and] trial
judges of this state are not unfamiliar with the fact that malpractice actions often fail for lack of medical expert testimony ....43
However, the court also pointed out that the mere inability of the
plaintiff to procure an expert will not serve as a reason for accepting a
witness not otherwise qualified.
One of the adverse side effects of the dilemma of the "conspiracy of
silence" is the growing number of professional witnesses. To combat this
problem, an attorney who suspects that the witness he is confronting has
testified regularly may cross-examine that expert to establish how often in
the past he has been a witness for the attorney calling him to the stand.44
OVERCOMING THE "CONSPIRACY"

Fortunately, there are alternatives available to the harrassed plaintiff
in overcoming the "conspiracy of silence." Not only are there some currently
existent, but more are being created constantly.
40
41
42
43
44

30 N.J. Super. 423, 105 A.2d 10 (1954).
Id. at 424, 105 A.2d at 11.
Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953).
Id. at 484, 94 A.2d at 684.
Plambeck v. Chicago Ry. Co., 294 I1. 302, 128 N.E. 513 (1920).
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SUBPOENA OF EXPERTS

Of those alternatives currently available, there is one that has dubious
merit. The plaintiff may subpoena anyone to appear as a witness, including
an expert. 45 However, one who is a stranger to the case who is served with
compulsory process in the hope that he will shed favorable light on the
case can be a dangerous witness. It is doubtful that such an unwilling witness would be desirous of aiding the litigant who has caused his inconvenience. In this instance, to have no witness might be better than to have
a reluctant one.
SECTION 60 OF THE ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE ACT

46

The "adverse party" rule, Section 60 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act,

is another of the alternatives which plaintiff may invoke in combating the
"conspiracy of silence," aiding him to prove his case. As has been previously established, the plaintiff, in most instances, requires the aid of a
qualified expert witness in order to prove a prima facie case. As has also
been previously established, it is difficult to obtain testimony of such expert.
However, the defendant being a doctor is himself an expert on the issues
being litigated. Section 60 provides a method by which the plaintiff can call
the defendant as an expert witness. It provides:
Upon the trial of any case any party thereto or any person for
whose immediate benefit the action is prosecuted or defended, or
the officers, directors, managing agents or foreman of any party to
the action, may be called and examined as if under cross-examination at the instance of any adverse party. The party calling for the
examination is not concluded thereby but may rebut the testimony
thus given by countertestimony and may
impeach the witness by
47
proof of prior inconsistent statements.
The purpose of the "adverse party" rule is to permit production of all
pertinent and relevant evidence and information. The defendant, in a
civil action, has no inherent right to remain silent and must, if called as a
witness, respond to inquiries aimed at eliciting information, even if it will
further his opponent's case and hinder his own. The utility of the rule was
best summarized by one court when it stated:
45 Il. Rev. Stat. ch. 110 § 62 (1965). It should be noted, however, that all jurisdictions do not permit the subpoena of an independent, disinterested witness. An Indiana

court remarked, "[T]o compel a person to attend [a trial] merely because he is accomplished in a particular science, art or profession, would subject the same individual to
be called upon . . . in every cause ....
Thus, the most eminent physicians might be compelled . . . to attend from the remotest part of the district, and give his opinion in every

trial in which a medical question should arise." Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1, 6 (1877),
cited with approval in Kraushear Bros. & Co. v. Thorpe, 296 N.Y. 223, 72 N.E.2d 165
(1947).
46 I1. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 60 (1965).
47 Ibid. This statutory provision is available to either the plaintiff or the defendant.
Experience, however, has proven to be of greater utility to the plaintiff. This is logical.
He has the task of producing evidence and this represents one means by which he can
achieve this end.
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Plaintiff, in a malpractice case, may call defendant and ask
him both as to his factual knowledge of the case and, if he is so
generally acqualified, as an expert for the purpose of establishing
48
cepted medical practice in the community.
Thus, the primary use is to have the defendant establish the standard
of care that an average physician in good standing would use in the same or
similar circumstances. The recent Texas case, Wilson v. Scott, 49 best illustrates this use. In that case, the patient suffered a hearing defect caused by
a bony growth on the stapes bone. The physician recommended a stapedectomy with a vein graft, a relatively new and complicated operation.
After the operation, the patient lost all hearing in the treated ear. The patient contended that the defendant-doctor failed to disclose all risks of the
surgery. The defendant contended he did make sufficient disclosure. The
court stated that the plaintiff had "the burden to prove by expert medical
evidence what a reasonable medical practitioner of the same school and
same or similar community under the same or similar circumstances would
have disclosed to his patient about the risks incident to a proposed diagnosis or treatment." 50 However, the court said that when the defendantphysician was called as an adverse witness and testified that it was proper
to inform a patient that a total hearing loss could result, he had established
the standard.
One of the secondary uses of Section 60 is to get the defendant to
testify as to what procedure he followed, thus possibly establishing the
breach. Closely connected to this use of the "adverse party" rule is having
the defendant make admissions against interest on the stand, by which the
jury could infer that a breach of the duty owed was committed. One recent
Illinois case 5' that might have been brought under Section 60, arose out of
injuries suffered due to an overexposure to X-rays. The factual issue was
whether a ten minute exposure to 2,050 roentgens would conform to proper
medical practice. An expert for the defendant stated that it would be proper
medical procedure and not harmful. However, the defendant himself made
a damaging admission on cross-examination. He confessed that the administration of such dosage would be taking "an undue chance." The jury
found that the defendant breached the standard of care to be followed and
held for the plaintiff. The appellate court affirmed, stating that although
defendant's testimony was favorable to the plaintiff, it was admissible.
Although Section 60 may be used to attempt to get an admission from
the defendant, it should be noted that it is highly improbable that the defendant-doctor will harm his own case by a ruinous slip of the conscience.
82
As the court said in one New York case:
48

McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear, Throat Clinic, 15 N.Y.2d 20, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65

(1964).
49 412
50 Id.

S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1967).
at 302.
51 Gorman v. St. Francis Hosp., 60 Ill.
App. 2d 440, 208 N.E.2d 653 (1st Dist. 1965).
52 Supra note 49, at 30, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 73.

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

While it may be the height of optimism to expect that such a
plaintiff will gain anything by being able to call and question the
very doctor he is suing, the decision whether or not to do so is one
which rests with the plaintiff alone.
THE PIMA COUNTY PLAN

The need for the plaintiff having to search for his experts with the
hope that he can find a doctor to testify against his colleagues could be
eliminated by the greater use of the Pima County Plan. Named after Pima
County, Arizona, where it originated, the Pima County Plan consists of a
joint panel of an equal number of doctors and lawyers. The plaintiff, after
unsuccessfully looking for an expert, comes before the panel and pleads his
case. The panel after hearing the case deliberates together. The lawyers
weigh the legal merits of the case, while the doctors weigh the medical
merits. The panel then presents its findings. If the findings are favorable,
to the plaintiff, the panel then undertakes to appoint a qualified doctor to
assist the plaintiff in court. If the panel holds adversely to the plaintiff's
contention, the plaintiff is honor bound to abide by the panel's consensus,
unless there exists compelling overriding reasons to the contrary.
The Pima County Plan ranks as the most realistic and reasonable plan
for combating the "conspiracy of silence."
TEXTBOOKS

In some progressive jurisdictions, 53 textbooks can be substituted for
the use of experts as the method of proving the plaintiff's case. The impetus to add this method of proof probably arose out of the realization that
the "conspiracy of silence" needed a counter-force.
The Nevada statute 54 provides that upon the giving of thirty day
notice, a party may offer into evidence the contents of a textbook written
by a recognized authority in the profession as an alternative for expert testimony. The striking feature of this method of proof is that the evidence provided by this textual matter is a substitute for and not merely a corroborating source for the live expert witnesses. The statute applies to issues
where expert testimony would be ordinarily required.
It should be noted that textbooks may also be used in Illinois, not expressly for the purpose of proving the facts they set forth, but for the purpose of cross-examination. The older rule in Illinois55 was that if an
expert admits that he bases his opinion on certain textbooks, he may be
interrogated and impeached as to those authorities. This rule has been
modified and broadened by the recent case of Darling v. CharlestonMemo53 Nevada and Massachusetts. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 51.040 (1900). Mass. Ann. Law, ch.
233 § 79C (1956).
54 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 51.040 (1900).
55 Ullrich v. Chicago City Ry., 265 Ill. 338, 106 N.E. 828 (1914).
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rial Hosp.56 The court in that case stated that the rule that an expert can
be impeached only as to texts he had admitted reading, is not supported by
sound reason. The court while declaring that the physician may be questioned on well-known medical authorities in the field stated:
To prevent cross-examination upon the relevant body of
knowledge [i.e., other than those texts the expert had admitted to
have read] serves only to protect the ignorant or unscrupulous expert witness. In our opinion expert testimony will be a more effective tool in the attainment of justice if cross-examinations are permitted as to the views of recognized authorities, expressed
in
7
treatises or periodicals written for professional colleagues.5
Admittedly, the plaintiff could only use the textbooks for cross-examination. However, if the defendant-physician had testified that he used one
type of procedure, and then was questioned as to another type of procedure
followed by an eminent textbook authority, might not the jury accept the
latter procedure as the proper standard of care? Would not this be true
despite the limiting jury instruction that the textbook may not be used to
prove the plaintiff's case?
As welcome as the method of the use of textbooks is, it is not a panacea,
standing alone. It has shortcomings. The most a plaintiff can hope to prove
by using a textbook is what leading authorities, at the time of publication
of their text, recommend as the medical procedures to be followed. Even
outstanding textbooks may become outdated soon after publication and
they are therefore subject to the threat of impeachment. Furthermore, the
textbook is only useful in showing what the standard of care is in the field
generally. It does not contemplate the exigencies of the moment or the
particular case. Nor does it show how the defendant deviated from the
standard, and either an expert witness or a lay witness must be relied upon
to supply that information.
REs IPSA LOQUITUR

Res ipsa loquitur is an important weapon in combating the "conspiracy
of silence." However, it is much more. It can be an important tool of the
plaintiff in some situations where he has difficulty in limelighting or focusing on the specific negligent act or acts complained of. If the requirements
for res ipsa loquitur are present, it can be of use regardless of whether or not
a "conspiracy" is shown. It is an important method of presenting proof.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is based on the persuasiveness of
circumstantial evidence. It allows the jury to raise an inference of negligence by proof of general circumstantial evidence. The basic ingredients
of res ipsa loquitur are that: (1) the event complained of ordinarily does
56 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965). Affirming 50 IlL. App. 2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149
(1964). Cert. den., 383 U.S. 964, 86 Sup. Ct. 1204 (1965).
57 Id. at 335, 211 N.E.2d at 259.
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not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) the injury complained
of was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control
of the defendant; and (3) that the plaintiff was free from contributory
negligence. 58
In Illinois one begins with the basic premise that res ipsa loquitur
does not automatically apply in malpractice cases.59 This is true because
the law presumes that as the doctor enters the courtroom he has acted skillfully, and even the death of the patient does not raise a presumption of
negligence. 60 The doctrine is inapplicable also when it is being used merely
61
because the treatment was unsuccessful.
What then is the essential usefulness of the doctrine? First, the doctrine
may be invoked where the patient's injury or malady is one which ordinarily would not occur without negligence. Thus, in the California case of
Gerhardt v. Fresno,62 the plaintiff suffered from paralysis of the trapezius
which resulted from a crushing of the spinal accessory nerve by a hemostat
(clamping device) during surgery. It was testified to that the cause of injury,
was extremely rare and was not an inherent risk of the operation if due
care was used. The court said that the injury was "more probably than not
the result of the negligence . . . ." The inference of negligence in the plaintiff's favor, which thus arose under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, required
the defendant to explain why or how the nerve was clamped.63
Thus, in the first use of res ipsa loquitur doctrine, expert testimony
must be relied upon to determine that the injury ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of negligence. At this point, an inference is raised that the defendant was negligent and the plaintiff need not go further in establishing
by expert testimony what the standard of care required is. 6 4
The doctrine may also be invoked where it is within the common
knowledge of both the expert and laymen alike that the results of the treatment do not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence. The typical type
of case where the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is used is when a surgical
sponge is discovered in the patient's body. The courts have found this to be
prima facie evidence of negligence.6 5 It is within the common knowledge of
everyone that sponges do not appear inside a patient, absent someone's
negligence.
58 See, Prosser, Torts § 39 (3d ed. 1964).
59 Graham v. St. Luke's Hosp., 46 Ill. App. 2d 147, 196 N.E.2d 355 (1964).
60 Hoover v. Backman, 194 111. App. 308 (Ist Dist. 1915) (abstr.).
61 Graiziger v. Henssler, 229 111. App. 365 (1st Dist. 1923).
62 217 Cal. App. 2d 353, 31 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1963).
68 Id. at 360.
64 See also, Fehrman v. Smirl, 20 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W.2d 255 (1963) for a medical
malpractice action relying on res ipsa loquitur and using expert testimony to show that
an injury to the external sphincter during suprapubic prostatectomy does not ordinarily
occur in the absence of negligence.
65 Hall v. Grosvenor, 267 Ill. App. 119 (Ist Dist. 1932).
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Another example of the "common knowledge" use of res ipsa loquitur
is found in the California case of Bauer v. Otis.66 That case involved a
"wrist drop" which occurred immediately following a needle injection of
a vitamin complex. The court, in holding the doctrine applied, declared:
Needle injections of cold shots, penicillin, and many other
serums have become commonplace today. Hardly a man, woman or
child ... exists in this country who has not had injections of one
kind or another .... So the giving and receiving of injections and
the lack of nerve injury 67therefrom ordinarily has become a matter
of common knowledge."
The third use that has been made of res ipsa loquitur is when the
defendant had greater knowledge of the facts which caused the injury
than did the plaintiff. The use of the doctrine is exemplified best by the
California case of Ybarra v. Spangard.6 8 In the case, an appendectomy was
performed on the plaintiff. During the operation, as in any usual operation,
there were several members of the operating team present, including surgeons, nurses and the anesthetist. Subsequent to the operation the defendant suffered from pain in his right shoulder. This pain grew worse and
developed into a paralysis and atrophy of the muscles around the shoulder.
The plaintiff sued the defendant-surgeon and the rest of the operating team.
He founded his case on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as he could not
identify the exact cause of his injury. The court held that since the evidence
that would explain the paralysis was within the knowledge of the defendants having control over the plaintiff's body, they may be called upon to
meet the inference of negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct.
Illinois has not permitted, as of yet, this application of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. Illinois still requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant charged with negligence had exclusive control over the instrumentalities that could have caused the injury. In Ybarra, several defendants
could have been the cause. However, as a practical solution to determining
who caused the injury, the plaintiff should join all parties even remotely
responsible for the cause of injury. So as to relieve themselves of liability,
the parties themselves, without application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, will come into court and explain their conduct.
THE LAY WITNES

Although much has been said of the indispensability of the expert
witness, there are instances where the expert witness can be substituted by
a lay witness. The use of the lay witness in no way detracts from the manifest need for the expert, but in a few situations a lay witness will suffice.
The role the lay witness may best play in aiding the plaintiff in proving
66 133 Cal. App. 2d 439, 284 P.2d 133 (1955).
67 Id. at 444, 284 P.2d at 136.
68 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
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his case was best expressed by an Illinois appellate tribunal6 9 when it
stated:
While with reference to diseases in the human body, only men
versed in the science of surgery or medicine are qualified to pass
judgment on treatment given in a particular case, it does not need
the aid of expert testimony for any intelligent person to form an
opinion as to the impropriety of leaving a foreign object in a
wound.
Thus, when the standard of care required of the physician is obvious
to the average juror, a non-expert, lay witness can testify. The most frequent
type of case which the court would hold that a lay witness can be used to
testify to the standard of care required is when there is an external injury
70
observable by anyone.
When a more complicated issue on the standard of care required is
involved, the standard must be established by an expert-physician. However, in case of gross negligence, the departure from such standard may be
shown by the testimony of a lay witness. Once the expert has established
what the standard should have been, the lay witness may tell what actually
transpired, that is, what techniques the defendant did use. The jury may
then ascertain whether the conduct described by the lay witness was at
variance with what the expert declared ought to have been done.71
HOWARD M. HOFFMANN
GERALD J. SMOLLER

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENSE IN MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION
The gist of an action against a physician or surgeon for malpractice
is usually negligence rather than breach of contract.1 Thus, in Illinois, the
plaintiff must allege in his complaint that he was in the exercise of due care
or was free from contributory negligence at the time of the injury. 2 Once
the issue of contributory negligence has been raised by the pleadings, the
plaintiff has the burden of proving that he was in the exercise of due care
3
at the time.
69
70

Supra note 66.
Richisen v. Nann, 340 P.2d 793 (Wash. 1959). See also, Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 637

(1962).
71

See Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 637 (1962).

1 26 I.L.P. Medicine and Surgery § 36 (1956); 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 57
(1951). A charge of negligence is grounded on a failure to use due care. However, arising
out of the doctor-patient relationship is a contractual duty, express or implied, to use due
care; thus a breach of contract.
2 Ibid.
3 Mcllvain v. Gaele, 128 Ill. App. 209 (4th Dist. 1906).

